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OPINION OF THE COURT 






NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.  
 In this appeal, we must decide whether an employer 
granting paid leaves of absence to employees who then become the 
union's full-time grievance chairmen violates § 302 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186.  The district court 
held that this practice is illegal, relying on our decision in 
Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 785 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1986).  We will 




 The facts are stated comprehensively in the district 
court's opinion, Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, United 
Automobile Workers, 909 F. Supp. 254 (M.D. Pa. 1995).  For our 
purposes it suffices to recount that the United Auto Workers, its 
Local 786 and Caterpillar have been parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement since 1954.  Until 1973, the agreement 
contained a "no-docking" provision allowing employees who were 
also union stewards and committeemen to devote part of their work 
days to processing employee grievances without losing pay, 
benefits or full-time status.  In 1973, this agreement was 
expanded to allow the union's full-time union committeemen and 
grievance chairmen to devote their entire work week to union 





of absence and are paid at the same rate as when they last worked 
on the factory floor.  They conduct that business from the union 
hall, perform no duties directly for Caterpillar, and are not 
under the control of Caterpillar except for time-reporting 
purposes. 
 In 1991, a nationwide labor dispute erupted between 
Caterpillar and the union, which resulted in the employees 
returning to work without a contract.  A year later, Caterpillar 
unilaterally informed the union that it would cease paying the 
grievance chairmen and questioned the legality of such payments, 
notwithstanding that it had paid them without complaint for 
eighteen years.  The union filed an unfair labor practice charge 
with the National Labor Relations Board, alleging that, by 
unilaterally rescinding the payments, Caterpillar refused to 
bargain in good faith.  A month later, Caterpillar filed this 
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that those payments violate § 
302 of the LMRA. 
 The district court stayed its proceedings pending the 
decision of the NLRB.  An administrative law judge later issued a 
recommended decision and order dismissing the union's charges, 
finding that the payments violated § 8 of the National Labor 
Relations Act.1  The district court then lifted the stay and  
                     
1.  The ALJ, while questioning the validity of the payments under 






held that Caterpillar's payments to the union's full-time 




 Section 302(a) of the LMRA provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any employer . . . to pay, 
lend, deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or 
deliver, any money or other thing of value-- 
 
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are 
employed in an industry affecting commerce;  or 
 
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee 
thereof, which represents . . . any of the employees of 
such employer who are employed in an industry affecting 
commerce[.] 
 
29 U.S.C. § 186(a).  Caterpillar is an employer in an industry 
that affects commerce and the grievance chairmen are 
representatives of Caterpillar's employees.  On the face of § 
302(a), then, Caterpillar's wage payments to them would appear to 
be unlawful.  Section 302(c), however, provides that 
[t]he provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) in 
respect to any money or other thing of value payable by 
an employer . . . to any representative of his 
employees, . . . who is also an employee or former 
employee of such employer, as compensation for, or by 
reason of, his service as an employee of such 
employer[.] 
 
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1).   Thus, if the grievance chairmen receive 
their compensation "by reason of" their "service as employees," 





 In Trailways, the employer agreed to continue making 
contributions to a joint union-management trust fund on behalf of 
employees who had taken leaves of absence to devote their time to 
full-time union positions.2  There, the union argued that those   
 payments could pass muster under § 302(c)(1), which  permits 
payments to former employees "as compensation for, or by reason 
of, [their] service as . . . employee[s.]"  The Trailways court 
rejected that possibility as a matter of statutory construction, 
opining: 
To the Union, the pension fund contributions made on 
behalf of former employees currently on leave 
to serve as union officials were earned 
solely "by reason" of their past service to 
Trailways.  But for their past employment by 
Trailways, the Union contends, these 
officials would not be eligible for pension 
fund contributions;  therefore, these 
payments are "by reason of their service as 
an employee of" Trailways. 
 
 A logical reading of the statute makes clear 
that the  "payments to former employees' 
exemption" of § 302(c)(1) applies solely to 
payments made as "compensation or by reason 
of" the former employees past service to the 
employer.  While the Union is correct in 
asserting that had these individuals never 
been Trailways' employees they would not be 
eligible for pension contributions made on 
their behalf, it does not therefore follow 
that the pension fund contributions made by 
Trailways pursuant to the collective 
                     
2.   One issue before the court was whether the payments were 
lawful under § 302(c)(5), which grants an exception for payments 
to pension trust funds.  The Trailways court concluded, however, 
that the § 302(c)(5) exception applies only to current employees 
and held that the union officials did not fit that description 
because Trailways did not have sufficient control over their work 
and because their work was solely for the benefit of the union.  





bargaining agreement were made "in 
compensation for, or by reason of," their 
former service to Trailways so as to fall 
within the § 302(c)(1) exception.  Clearly, 
the statute contemplates payments to former 
employees for past services actually rendered 
by those former employees while they were 
employees of the company.  Just as clearly, 
however, the pension fund benefits paid on 
behalf of former employees serving as union 
officials while on leave from Trailways are 
not compensation for their past service to 
Trailways. 
 
Id. at 105-06 (emphasis in original).3 
 Were we to follow Trailways, its holding would control 
our decision in this case.  The grievance chairmen cannot be 
considered current employees of Caterpillar who are being 
compensated for their current services.  The chairmen perform no 
services directly for Caterpillar.  Instead, they handle 
grievances and other labor matters for the union, a situation 
that often places them in a position adverse to Caterpillar's.  
Section 302(c)(1) legalizes payments to current or former 
employees based on their "services" as employees, not their 
"status" as such.  Thus, the mere fact that the chairmen remain 
on the Caterpillar payroll and fill out the appropriate forms and 
time sheets to get paid is legally irrelevant.   
 The union argues that, unlike the situation under 
subsection (c)(5) in Trailways, under subsection (c)(1) the 
                     
3.  In a footnote, the court noted that the pension contributions 
were based on the employees' current union salary, indicating 
that the payments were "geared to their contemporaneous services 





chairmen can be employees of both the union and the employer.  It 
relies especially on NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 116 S. Ct. 
450, 456 (1995), in which the Supreme Court held that a paid 
union organizer who obtained a job in order to "salt" the 
workforce and organize for the union was still an employee within 
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.  But there, the 
Court noted that the employee still performed services for the 
benefit and under the control of the employer, even though part 
of his time was spent organizing for the union.  That situation 
is different from ours.  Here the chairmen do nothing for 
Caterpillar's benefit. 
 Moreover, under Trailways we cannot conclude that the 
chairmen's salaries were payments to former employees "as 
compensation for" their past services as employees.  The chairmen 
were already compensated for their production line work long ago 
in the form of wages and vested benefits.  A fair reading of 
Trailways does not support a finding that the payments at issue 
here somehow "related back" to these former employees' services 
on the factory floor. 
 
 B. 
 Nevertheless, after careful consideration and 
reargument before the in banc court, we believe that Trailways 





and fully disclosed payments to the criminal sanctions of the 
LMRA. 
 We have no difficulty with the Trailways holding 
regarding "current employee" status.  See 785 F.2d at 106-07.  We 
also believe that the salary payments to these union officials 
were not in compensation for their past services rendered as 
production employees.  Our disagreement is with the Trailways 
court's conclusion that the "by reason of" language in § 
302(c)(1) exempts only those payments for past services actually 
rendered while the former employee was still employed by the 
company.  We think that statement misinterprets the text of § 
302(c)(1) and does nothing to further the policy objectives 
Congress had when it enacted the LMRA half a century ago. 
 The Trailways test would be quite appropriate if § 
302(c)(1) referred only to payments as compensation for past 
services.  It is difficult indeed to comprehend how years, even 
decades, of paid union leave can realistically be thought of as 
compensation for time spent on the factory floor.  The Trailways 
court, however, applied the same test to the statute's "by reason 
of" language; with that we can no longer agree. 
 First of all, Congress chose specifically to exempt 
payments in "compensation for" or "by reason of" an employee's 
service.  By so doing, it must be presumed to have intended that 
certain payments would be legal, even though they were not, as 





former employees while they were employees of the company."  Id. 
at 106 (emphasis deleted).  Nevertheless, the Trailways court, 
without any explanation, conflated the two phrases and developed 
a unitary test for whether former employee compensation is 
permissible. 
 Under the Trailways test, there are three requirements 
for a "former employee" payment to qualify for the § 302(c)(1) 
exemption: 
(1) It must be for past, not present, services; 
 
(2) the services must be actually rendered; and 
 
(3) the services must have been rendered while the 
payee was still an employee. 
 
Under this standard,  the chairmen's wages fail the Trailways 
test, because the payments are not for services actually rendered 
to the company while they were still employees.  Indeed, under 
Trailways, it appears that pay or continuation of benefits for 
time spent serving on a jury or in the National Guard would be 
illegal. 
    Likewise, even the "no docking" provisions of many 
collective bargaining agreements, including the Caterpillar-UAW 
contract here, fail to meet the Trailways standard.  Under a no-
docking clause, the employer agrees that shop stewards may leave 
their assigned work areas for portions of a day to process 
employee grievances without loss of pay.  By paying production 
workers for the part-time hours when they leave their regular 





for it, since those employees are already receiving their regular 
hourly wages and benefits for their production line work.  Yet, 
no-docking arrangements have been consistently upheld by the 
courts as not in violation of § 302, see NLRB v. BASF Wyandotte 
Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 854-56 (5th Cir. 1986); BASF Wyandotte Corp. 
v. Local 227, 791 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1986); Herrera v. 
International Union, UAW, 73 F.3d 1056 (10th Cir. 1996), aff'g & 
adopting dist. ct. analysis, 858 F. Supp. 1529, 1546 (D. Kan. 
1994); Communications Workers v. Bell Atlantic Network Servs., 
Inc., 670 F. Supp. 416, 423-24 (D.D.C. 1987); Employees' 
Independent Union v. Wyman Gordon Co., 314 F. Supp. 458, 461 
(N.D. Ill. 1970), and Caterpillar does not even seek to have the 
contract's no-docking clause declared illegal.  Moreover, as the 
union points out, it would be strange indeed if Congress intended 
that granting four employees two hours per day of paid union 
leave is permissible, while granting a single employee eight 
hours per day of that same leave is a federal crime. 
 We believe that the payments at issue here, while they 
were not compensation for hours worked in the past, certainly 
were "by reason of" that service.  We reach this conclusion 
because the payments arose, not out of some "back-door deal" with 
the union, but out of the collective bargaining agreement itself. 
 Caterpillar was willing to put that costly benefit on the table, 
which strongly implies that the employees had to give up 





have received.  Thus, every employee implicitly gave up a small 
amount in current wages and benefits in exchange for a promise 
that, if he or she should someday be elected grievance 
chairperson, Caterpillar would continue to pay his or her 
salary.4 As our colleague Judge Becker pointed out, dissenting in 
Trailways: 
 The collective bargaining agreement contains 
the terms of workers' employment with 
Trailways;  each of the benefits the workers 
receive under that collective bargaining 
agreement are part of the consideration for 
their services at Trailways.  In addition to 
the standard terms for wages, overtime pay, 
and insurance, the collective bargaining 
agreement provides that persons who take a 
leave of absence to work as union officials 
have a right to reinstatement at Trailways 
after their union service and retain their 
seniority during their absence.  The 
collective bargaining agreement also provides 
that the employer will make payments into the 
union's pension fund while the employee is on 
leave.  Although these contributions are made 
during the leaves of absence, the employer's 
promise to pay them is nonetheless a term of 
the collective bargaining agreement and 
therefore a part of the consideration for 
work performed as a Trailways employee.  
There is no reason for distinguishing the 
pension fund payments from any of the other 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 
 Like wages, overtime, insurance, or accrued 
seniority, the pension fund payments are 
consideration for services rendered and, as 
such, are permissible under § 302(c)(1). 
 
Trailways, 785 F.2d at 109 (Becker, J., dissenting). 
                     
4.  We do not mean to imply that an employee hired after a 
collective bargaining agreement could not be elected chairperson 
because he or she never "agreed" to an implicit wage reduction.  
Rather, like any other term of a labor agreement, it would be 






 We find this line of reasoning persuasive.  Indeed, it 
has been taken by a number of decisions reached after Trailways. 
 See United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1575 (11th Cir. 
1994) (§ 302(c)(1) satisfied when former employee's entitlement 
to payments vests before he or she goes out on leave, but not 
after); Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1301-04 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(criticizing Trailways and opining that "[o]ne obvious instance 
in which continuing payments constitute recompense for past 
services is when those continuing payments were bargained for and 
formed part of a collective bargaining agreement."); IBEW v. 
National Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 16 Employee Benefits Cases 2018, 
2020-21 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); Bell Atlantic, 670 F. Supp. at 
421-22 (same).  We are aware of no currently valid opinion that 
follows the Trailways holding. 
 Caterpillar maintains that, under the reasoning we have 
utilized, employers and unions can themselves decide what is 
legal regardless of federal law by agreeing in a labor contract 
to a particular course of conduct.  Our point, however, is not 
that a collective bargaining agreement can immunize unlawful 
conduct, but that: (1) under  § 302(c)(1), the lawfulness of the 
conduct ab initio turns on whether the payment is "owed because 
of . . . service as an employee"; and (2) what is "owed" depends 
on the terms of the contract.  Put differently, the contract does 
not immunize otherwise unlawful subjects but, by defining the 





the statute as to whether the payments are "compensation for, or 
by reason of . . . service as an employee."   
 We also believe that any attempt to distinguish "no 
docking" provisions from the payments at issue here is 
unpersuasive.  We perceive no distinction between union officials 
who spend part of their time (which may be quite substantial) in 
adjusting grievances from the type of employees who are involved 
here.  Instead, “the nature of the absences and the payments made 




 In sum, we simply do not view the payments at issue 
here as posing the kind of harm to the collective bargaining 
process that Congress contemplated when it enacted the LMRA.  
Section 302 of that statute was passed to address bribery, 
extortion and other corrupt practices conducted in secret.  See 
Trailways, 785 F.2d at 110 (Becker, J., dissenting).  These 
expanded "no-docking" provisions, in contrast, are contained in 
the collective bargaining agreement on which each rank-and-file 
employee has the opportunity to vote.  Thus, the officials 
receiving the payments can be held accountable to the membership. 
 See Toth, 883 F.2d at 1304.  Without explicit statutory 
direction from Congress, we cannot condemn these payments as 






          Circuit 





MANSMANN, J., dissenting, with whom Judge Greenberg joins. 
 In suggesting that "innocuous, bargained for and fully 
disclosed payments" from an employer to an employee 
representative should be lawful, the majority has placed its own 
policy objectives above plain language.  By its own terms, the 
"by reason of" exception of 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1) simply does not 
include payments made to an employee representative merely 
because the payment is included in a collective bargaining 
agreement and the representative worked for the employer at one 
time.  The plain language of the section 186(c)(1) exception is 
supported by the legislative history and purpose of the 
exception, and the majority's conclusion is at odds with 
important federal policy.  Because I believe that the payments at 
issue in this case do not fall within the exception of section 
186(c)(1), I respectfully dissent. 
 
 I. 
 Where statutory language is plain, we must enforce that 
language according to its terms.  Appalachian States Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Comm'n v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 





235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); New Rock 
Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, Inc., ___ 
F.3d ___, ___, 1996 WL 708610, at *5 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 1996) 
(unless literal application will produce absurd result, plain 
meaning is conclusive).  It is for Congress, not the courts, to 
create exceptions or qualifications at odds with the LMRA's plain 
terms.  Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 490, 67 
S.Ct. 789, 792, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947). 
 Section 302(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(a), on its 
face, makes it unlawful for any employer to pay any money or 
thing of value to any representative of its employees.  As the 
majority recognizes, section 302(a), standing alone, prohibits 
the payments at issue in this case.  Maj. Op., at 4-5. 
 Section 302(a) contains several exceptions.  Section 
302(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1), renders section 302(a) 
inapplicable in respect to any money or other thing of value 
payable by an employer "to any representative of his employees, 
who is also an employee or former employee of such employer, as 
compensation for, or by reason of, his services as an employee of 
such employer." 
 The majority concedes that the payments at issue in 
this case are not payments to a current or former employee "as 
compensation for . . . his services."  Maj. Op., at 8.  The sole 
issue, then, is whether the payments to a former employee, who 





made "by reason of . . . his services as an employee of such 
employer."  Contrary to the position of the majority, I must 
conclude that the language of section 302(c)(1) is plain and does 
not encompass the payments at issue here. 
 The "by reason of" exception of section 302(c)(1) 
simply recognizes that current and former employees might have a 
right to receive payments from their employers that arise from 
their services for their employers but that are not properly 
classified as "compensation."  The "by reason of" exception 
includes pensions, 401(k) plans, life and health insurance, sick 
pay, vacation pay, jury and military leave pay, and other fringe 
benefits to which all employees may be entitled "by reason of" 
their service.  See United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1575 
(11th Cir. 1994) ("by reason of" exception applies to fringe 
benefits "such as vacation pay, sick pay, and pension benefits"), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1312, 131 L.Ed.2d 194 
(1995); BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, Int'l Chem. Workers 
Union, AFL-CIO, 791 F.2d 1046, 1049 (2d Cir. 1986) ("by reason 
of" payments include "vacation pay, sick pay, paid leave for jury 
duty or military service, pension benefits, and the like"); see 
also Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 1297, 1303 n.8 (7th Cir.) 
(severance pay and payments to disabled employees are "by reason 
of" former employment), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994, 110 S.Ct. 





compensation, "by reason of" payments "arise from" the employee's 
services for the employer. 
 Without the section 302(c)(1) exception, these payments 
would be illegal if paid to any employee or former employee who 
also worked for the union.  Thus, an employee who worked full 
time for the company, but who held a part-time position with the 
union (a practice permitted by the Supreme Court's decision in 
NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 450, 
133 L.Ed.2d 371 (1995)), would be unable to be paid his salary 
and could not receive fringe benefits -- despite working full 
time.  Section 302(c)(1) plainly exists to enable company 
employees to obtain what is rightfully theirs.  In other words, 
the section 302(c)(1) exception does not entitle union 
representatives to receive payments because of their service for 
the union; the exception allows union representatives to receive 
payments in spite of their current service for the union. 
 The key, however, is that the employee must receive the 
compensation or other payment because of his or her service for 
the employer.  See, e.g., Phillips, 19 F.3d at 1575 ("by reason 
of" payments "from an employer to a union official must relate to 
services actually rendered by the employee"); id. (under plain 
meaning of exception, "payment given to former employee must be 
for services he rendered while he was an employee"); BASF 
Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, 791 F.2d at 1049 ("by reason of" 





performed or will perform work for the employer, but which is not 
payment directly for that work"); Reinforcing Iron Workers Local 
Union 426 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 634 F.2d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 
1981) (under "literal construction" of section 302, payment to 
industry steward who performs services for union, not employer, 
are unlawful).  The payments at issue in this case are entirely 
unrelated to the representatives' services for the employer.  I 
believe that the plain language of the section 302(c)(1) 
exception does not encompass the payments at issue here and that 
we must affirm the judgment of the district court.5 
                     
5.  The majority overstates the effect of our decision in 
Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 785 F.2d 101 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 403, 93 L.Ed.2d 356 (1986). 
 Section 302(c)(1) states that all payments made to 
union representatives -- whether they are in direct compensation 
for services (wages) or merely by reason of those services 
(vacation pay, jury pay, et cetera) -- must somehow relate to 
those individuals' services for the employer.  The Trailways 
opinion did not merge "compensation for" and "by reason of" as 
the majority suggests; it does not dispute the fact that 
"compensation for" and "by reason of" complement each other and 
that the "by reason of" exception covers certain payments that 
are not truly compensation.  Instead, in Trailways we recognized 
that certain payments to former employees may no longer be 
justified once the individual stops performing services for the 
employer. 
 This makes sense.  For example, it is apparent that 
jury-duty pay is "by reason of" an employee's services to the 
employer.  It would be strange indeed if a former employee who 
retired five years ago could demand to be paid by the employer 
for his upcoming jury duty.  As Trailways recognizes, payments to 
former employees, whether as compensation for or by reason of 
their former services, must be related to that former service.  
Just as former employees are no longer entitled to "by reason of" 
pay such as jury-duty pay, they should not be entitled to 
payments for performance of union work that is entirely unrelated 
to their former service.  Accordingly, I see no reason to reverse 







 Because the plain language of the "by reason of" 
exception of section 302(c)(1) does not contemplate the payments 
at issue here, I would affirm the judgment of the district court 
without further discussion.  Nonetheless, as I now digress 
briefly to relate, the legislative history and the purpose of 
section 302 support my conclusion that the payments at issue are 
unlawful. 
 As the majority recognizes, section 302 is a conflict-
of-interest statute that is designed to eliminate practices that 
have the potential for corrupting the labor movement.  Maj. Op., 
at 13; see Phillips, 19 F.3d at 1574.  As the majority also 
recognizes, Congress was concerned about, inter alia, bribery and 
other secret, back-room agreements between employers and employee 
representatives.  See Toth, 883 F.2d at 1300. 
 The majority does not go far enough, however.  
Recognizing that "any person in a position of trust" must not 
"enter into transactions in which self-interest may conflict with 
complete loyalty to those whom they serve," Congress stated that 
"no responsible trade union official should have a personal 
financial interest which conflicts with the full performance of 
his fiduciary duties as a workers' representative."  S. Rep. No. 
187, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 





Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations).6  Congress 
desired to close the loopholes "which both employer 
representatives and union officials turned to advantage at the 
expense of employees."  Id. at 2330. 
 When he introduced section 302 in 1947, Senator Ball 
expressed a concern that even negotiated payments from employers 
might "degenerate into bribes."  93 Cong. Rec. 4805 (1947), 
reprinted in II NLRB Legislative History of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 1947, at 1305 (1948) (discussing welfare funds).  
Senator Ball stated that absent section 302, "there is a very 
grave danger that the funds will be used for the personal gain of 
union leaders."  Id.  Senator Byrd echoed the concerns of Senator 
Ball, noting that funds from the employer should not be "paid 
into the treasuries of the labor unions."  Id.  According to 
Senator Pepper, unless authorized in writing by each individual 
employee (in the form of dues check-off), "union leaders should 
not be permitted . . . to direct funds paid by the company . . . 
to the union treasury or union officers."  Id. (quoting committee 
report). 
                     
6.  I rely on the legislative history of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (an act that strengthened 
section 302), instead of the official history of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (the act that contained section 
302), because the Congressional Comments to the Labor Management 
Relations Act do not include a discussion of the provisions at 
issue here.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
66-67, reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1173.  In the text, I 
include the comments of three senators made prior to the passage 






 Section 302 therefore exists to prohibit "all forms of 
extortion and bribery in labor-management relations."  BASF 
Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, 791 F.2d at 1053 (emphasis 
supplied) (quoting S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 13, 
reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2329).  Congress was 
concerned with corruption through both (1) bribery of employee 
representatives by employers and (2) extortion by those 
representatives.  Toth, 883 F.2d at 1300 (citing legislative 
history and cases).  Congress explained: 
The national labor policy is founded upon collective 
bargaining through strong and vigorous 
unions.  Playing both sides of the street, 
using union office for personal financial 
advantage, undercover deals, and other 
conflicts of interest corrupt, and thereby 
undermine and weaken the labor movement. . . 
.  The Government . . . must make sure that 
the power [to act as exclusive bargaining 
representative] is used for the benefit of 
workers and not for personal profit. 
 
S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2331.   
 Thus, Congress was not merely concerned about secret, 
back-room deals.  Congress was concerned about any form of 
payment that could upset the balance between labor and 
management.  The payments at issue in this case do exactly that. 
 They create a conflict of interest for union negotiators who may 
agree to reduced benefits for the employees in exchange for 





 For example, let us assume that ABC Corporation and the 
union are engaged in difficult negotiations over a pension plan. 
 Also assume that the employer was stonewalling on this issue, 
that the union had the "correct" position, and that the company 
could have accepted the union's proposal without suffering 
noticeable financial impact.  Assume ABC said to the union 
negotiator: "I know your local is having financial trouble.  We 
will pay the salaries of the grievance chairmen if you stop 
pushing for this pension plan."  The negotiator, who knows that 
her local can no longer pay the full salaries of all the 
grievance chairmen, agrees, and the pension plan is dropped in 
favor of the financial security of the union.  The agreement is 
included in the bargaining agreement, and both the union and ABC 
effectively "sell" the agreement to the employees, who ratify it 
(not aware that the pension plan was sacrificed in this way).  
According to the majority, this scenario is perfectly lawful 
because it was included in the agreement.  According to the 
language, legislative history and purpose of section 302, 




 As the majority concedes, the grievance chairmen in 
this case do not perform any services whatsoever for Caterpillar. 





exclusively for the union.  The majority concludes, however, that 
payments to such union employees are "by reason of" the 
employees' services to the employer.  First, the majority reasons 
that such payments were negotiated and appear in the collective 
bargaining agreement.  Second, the majority states that, because 
each employee must "give up something" in negotiations with the 
employer so that these payments may be included in the agreement, 
such payments are somehow "by reason of" the employees' service 
for the employer.  Finally, the majority contends that the 
payments at issue in this case are no different than so-called 
"no-docking" payments made to current employees who process 
employee grievances during working hours.  I do not believe that 
the majority's reasoning withstands scrutiny. 
 The majority first relies on the fact that the payments 
were negotiated and included in the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Maj. Op., at 11-13.  Simply including a payment 
provision in a collective bargaining agreement does not, however, 
make the payment "by reason of" an employee's prior service. 
 Section 302(a)(1) provides that it shall be unlawful 
for any employer to "agree to pay" any money to any 
representative of any of his employees.  29 U.S.C. § 186(a)(1).  
Thus, actual payments to union representatives are prohibited, 
but so are agreements to pay union representatives.  The majority 
places special emphasis on the fact that the payments in this 





 Congress, on the other hand, was not concerned about the secrecy 
of these agreements.  If an agreement to pay is unlawful under 
section 302(a)(1), it is illogical to use that same agreement as 
a basis for finding that the resultant payment is lawful under 
section 302(c)(1).  Congress could easily have written an 
exception for payments by employers to union representatives 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.  Instead, Congress 
limited its section 302(c)(1) exception to payments in 
compensation for or by reason of a representative's services for 
the employer.7 
 The majority does not find support in the statute (and 
indeed there is none) for its conclusion that bargained-for 
payments should be any more legal than secret agreements.  
Without support, the majority asserts that an open agreement 
makes a payment "by reason of" services for the employer.  In so 
doing, the majority expands the exception such that the rule is 
rendered a nullity.8 
                     
7.  Senator Ball stated that the section 302(c)(1) exception 
allows payment of "money due a representative who is an employee 
or a former employee of the employer, on account of wages 
actually earned by him."  93 Cong. Rec. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 
II NLRB Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947, at 1304 (1948) (emphasis supplied).  It is apparent 
that Senator Ball did not contemplate that the narrow exception 
of section 302(c)(1) would someday encompass payments to a former 
employee that are entirely unrelated to the employee's services. 
8.  I am also concerned that by placing so much emphasis on the 
fact that the payments were negotiated and included in the 
collective bargaining agreement, the majority effectively permits 
employers and unions to negotiate over otherwise unlawful 
subjects of bargaining.  It is beyond dispute that employers and 





 The majority next reasons that since current employees 
must surely "give up something" during negotiations in exchange 
for an agreement by the employer to pay former employees to 
perform union work, then those payments must be "by reason of" 
their services.  Maj. Op., at 11.  The majority contends that 
"the employees had to give up something in the bargaining process 
that they otherwise could have received . . . in exchange for a 
promise that, if he or she should someday be elected grievance 
chairperson, Caterpillar would continue to pay his or her 
salary."  Id. 
 Under the majority's reasoning, the union and the 
company could also agree to have the employer pay the salary of 
the international union's president and subsidize the pension 
fund of the union's permanent staff -- all because the company's 
employees might "give up something" during negotiations in the 
hopes that they too might someday receive those payments if 
elected to serve the union in the proper capacity.  In deciding 
that "giv[ing] up something" is sufficient to bring the payments 
at issue in this case within the "by reason of" exception 
contained in section 302(c)(1), the majority has embarked on a 
slippery slope that will legitimize virtually any type of payment 
from the employer to the union so long as the payment is 
negotiated and included in the collective bargaining agreement. 
(..continued) 
Nonetheless, the majority uses the bargaining process to 





 The majority's reasoning violates the plain language of 
section 302(c)(1) in yet another way.  This section allows an 
employer to make payments to a current or former employee by 
reason of "his" services as an employee.  29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1). 
 The majority reasons that the payments at issue in this case are 
lawful by reason of all of the employees' collective service.  
This is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.  If a union 
official is to be paid by the employer, it must be by reason of 
that official's service to the employer -- not because of the 
service of others who might aspire to his position.  Indeed, if 
the collective bargaining agreement allowed, but did not require, 
that the grievance chairperson be a former employee of the 
company, then the company might find itself paying an individual 
who was never an employee of the company by reason of other 
employees' services for the company -- a result clearly not 
permitted by section 302(c)(1).  By relying on the collective 
service of the employees, the majority ignores the plain language 
of the statute. 
 I also fear that the majority's reasoning could be 
construed to apply to several situations which would defy logic. 
 For example, let us assume that an individual applies for (and 
obtains) a job with the employer.  One day after beginning work, 
the individual is elected grievance chairperson.  For the next 
thirty years,9 the individual serves as grievance chairperson and 
                     
9.  While the agreement in this case may contain a time 





performs no services for the employer.  Thus, the individual 
performed eight hours' worth of services for the employer, but 
was paid by the employer for thirty years.  The majority's claim 
that this individual is being paid for thirty years "by reason 
of" his one-day service for the employer is illogical. 
 In another example, let us assume that two grievance 
chairpersons are elected on the same day.  One ("Michael") worked 
for the employer for twenty years.  The other ("Mary") was active 
in the union but never worked for the employer.  Under the 
collective bargaining agreement in this case, the employer is 
required to pay Michael, but is prohibited from paying Mary.  At 
present, both Michael and Mary perform exactly the same services, 
but Michael's prior employment (for which he was already fully 
compensated) entitles him to continued payment from the 
employer.10 
 The majority's reasoning also fails as a matter of 
logic in "open shops."  In an open shop, not all employees 
(..continued) 
majority's reasoning.  Therefore, I presume that an agreement 
that does not contain a time restriction will not be unlawful 
under the majority's decision. 
10.  Altering this example somewhat, let us assume that Michael 
worked for twenty years before being elected grievance 
chairperson, but that Mary worked one day.  In this situation, 
the employer would be required to pay both Michael and Mary.  
Michael, however, "gave up" significantly more than Mary, as 
Michael worked for twenty years at reduced wages, while Mary only 
worked one day.  The employer does not take into account what 
each individual gave up -- the employer considers what the 
collective group gave up.  I contend that the employer may not do 





governed by the collective bargaining agreement will necessarily 
be members of the union.  An employee who is not a member of the 
union (and who therefore cannot aspire to become a grievance 
chairperson) will nonetheless be forced to endure a lower salary 
or reduced benefits due to his co-workers' decision to "give up 
something."  In addition, unions will be able to circumvent the 
problems that arise when some employees elect not to join the 
union or pay union dues -- they will seek agreements from the 
employer to subsidize representatives' salaries in exchange for 
reductions in pay or benefits.  These agreements will be 
negotiated and ratified without the input of the non-union 
employees.  Thus, an employee who elects not to pay union dues 
may nonetheless face reductions in salary or benefits so that the 
union (which he or she does not support) may prosper.  The 
payments at issue here are surely not "by reason of" the non-
union employees' services -- yet those same payments are made 
possible by the non-union employees' reduced salary and benefits. 
 
 IV. 
 Finally, the majority contends that since no-docking 
provisions are lawful under section 302, the payments at issue 
here should also be lawful.  The majority writes that "it would 
be strange indeed if Congress intended that granting four 





while granting a single employee eight hours per day of that same 
leave is a federal crime."  Maj. Op., at 10-11. 
 In reasoning that the payments at issue here are 
analogous to no-docking payments, the majority assumes (without 
deciding) that no-docking provisions are lawful.  While some 
courts have so held, we have not yet addressed the lawfulness of 
no-docking payments.  Until we do so (and until we explain our 
reasons for finding such payments lawful), the majority should 
not analogize such payments to those at issue here. 
 Assuming that no-docking provisions are lawful, 
however, we are still not required to reach the conclusion that 
the payments at issue in this case must also be lawful.  Indeed, 
there are substantial differences between no-docking payments and 
the payments at issue here.  The primary difference is that no-
docking payments are made to individuals who are current 
employees of the company currently performing services for the 
company.  In contrast, the payments at issue here are made to 
former employees of the company not performing any services for 
the company. 
 In BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, 791 F.2d 1046, 
the Second Circuit observed that payments made to current 
employees for short absences (such as vacation pay, sick pay, or 
military leave pay) are all made to current employees "by reason 
of" their current, ongoing services for their employer.  The 





absences to perform union work is no different from vacation pay, 
sick pay, and military leave pay.  Id. at 1049.  Thus, no-docking 
payments made to current employees who occasionally performed 
union work during working hours should be treated the same as 
other payments for short term absences. 
 Importantly, the court recognized that each of these 
payments were made to persons whose entitlement to the payments 
was "by reason of" current service.  As the court noted, "no-
docking provisions have relevance only to persons who are 
currently serving as employees."  Id. at 1049 n.1.  The common 
element linking sick pay and no-docking pay "is simply that the 
person to whom the employer makes payment is one who performs 
services as an employee."  Id. at 1049 (footnote omitted).  If we 
assume that no-docking payments are analogous to sick pay, we 
must conclude that they can only be made to current employees who 
perform services to their employers.  This makes sense -- former 
employees do not accrue sick pay or vacation pay.  Likewise, they 
should not accrue "union-work-time pay."  See also Phillips, 19 
F.3d at 1575 n.18 (recognizing difference between no-docking 
provision and payments to non-employees who perform no work for 
company).  
 The majority cites several cases from our sister courts 
of appeals where courts concluded that no-docking provisions are 
lawful.  In several of those cases, however, the courts carefully 





officials who did not perform work for the company.  In BASF 
Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, Int'l Chem. Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 
791 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1986), for example, the court stated: 
[W]e do not suggest that section [302(c)(1)] would 
allow an employer simply to put a union 
official on its payroll while assigning him 
no work. . . .  [A] union official who, 
though on an employer's payroll, performed no 
service as an employee, would not be within § 
302(c)(1)'s exception. 
 
Id. at 1050.  In another case cited by the majority, the court 
agreed that payments to a union official put on an employee 
payroll but not assigned any meaningful work would violate 
section 302.  NLRB v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 856 n.4 
(5th Cir. 1986). 
 The majority also cites Toth v. USX Corp., 883 F.2d 
1297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994, 110 S.Ct. 544, 107 
L.Ed.2d 541 (1989).  There the court of appeals stated: 
At some point, it is conceivable that a bargain struck 
by the union and the employer might yet 
violate section 302 -- if, for example, the 
terms of compensation for former employment 
were clearly so incommensurate with that 
former employment as not to qualify as 
payments "in compensation for or by reason 
of" that employment . . . . 
 
Id. at 1305.  As an example of a case that would violate section 
302, the court stated that "fulltime pay for no service cannot 
reasonably be said to be compensation 'by reason of' service as 
an employee."  Id. (citing BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, 791 





 Indeed, the distinction between no-docking payments and 
the payments at issue here is reinforced elsewhere in the labor 
laws.  For example, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) provides that it shall 
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to contribute 
financial support to any labor organization.  This rule contains 
one exception: "an employer shall not be prohibited from 
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours 
without loss of time or pay."  Id.  Thus, while employers may 
allow employees to confer with their employer during working 
hours without loss of pay, the employer may not contribute 
financial support to the labor organization.  The rule bans the 
payments at issue here; the exception allows no-docking 
provisions. 
 Other realities dictate that no-docking payments are 
simply not analogous to the payments at issue here.  For example, 
employees subject to no-docking payments are more likely to do 
union work on an "as needed" basis.  They are also more likely to 
be able to schedule grievance meetings and other union work at 
the mutual convenience of the employees and the employer.  In 
contrast, the grievance chairmen in this case are paid full time 
regardless of whether there is any union work to be done.  They 
are never available to perform services for the employer.  Thus, 
the four individuals who spend two hours per day performing union 
work (from the majority's hypothetical) are less of a burden for 







 While the majority emphasizes its policy determination 
that bargained-for payments should not be unlawful, it does not 
discuss several compelling policy reasons why we should affirm 
the judgment of the district court.  These policy considerations 
go far beyond the need to avoid conflict of interest among union 
negotiators, a policy that is clear on the face of the statute 
and in the legislative history. 
 Initially, as the majority recognizes, the grievance 
chairperson will often take a position at odds with the position 
of management.  Maj. Op., at 7.  Indeed, the grievance 
chairperson is most needed when the employee's position is 
adverse to the employer's.  In order to be effective, the 
grievance chairperson often will fight zealously for the 
aggrieved employee and against the employer.  Meanwhile, the 
employer must pay the chairperson's salary.  It seems illogical 
to me to force the employer to pay the salary of an individual 
whose sole function is to oppose the employer.11 
                     
11.  I recognize that the word "force" may be strong since the 
employer need not agree to pay the grievance chairperson during 
negotiations.  Assuming that this pay practice is not unlawful, 
however, the practice undoubtedly constitutes a mandatory subject 
of bargaining.  NLRB v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849, 852-
54 (5th Cir. 1986).  Thus, if the employer refused to accede to 
such a pay provision, the employees could strike over this issue. 
 Indeed, those employees who may have the most influence 
in swaying other employees' opinions regarding strike decisions 
are probably the same individuals who are most likely to be 
elected to the position of grievance chairmen.  I envision the 





 Next, by sanctioning an agreement whereby the company 
pays grievance chairmen to perform services for the union, the 
majority unnecessarily creates uncertainty over whether the 
chairmen are employees of the union or employees of the company. 
 In NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
450, 133 L.Ed.2d 371 (1995), the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of who is an employee under the NLRA.  The Court 
favorably cited several common definitions of "employee" -- 
including "person in the service of another . . . where the 
employer has the power or right to control and direct the 
employee . . . ."  Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 454 (citation 
omitted).  Under this definition, a grievance chairperson appears 
to be an employee of the union.  Citing an excerpt from the 
NLRA's legislative history, however, the Court noted that 
"employee" includes "every man on a payroll."  Id. at ___, 116 
S.Ct. at 454 (citation omitted).  Since grievance chairmen remain 
on the company's payroll, perhaps they remain employees of the 
company.  The majority does not decide whether the company or the 
union is the chairmen's employer.12 
(..continued) 
chairperson may seek to insure that his or her desired position 
is fully funded by the employer before he or she accepts the 
position -- even if that means encouraging a strike.  Even the 
possibility that this might occur demonstrates the conflict of 
interest that will surely arise among those individuals who may 
seek the funded positions. 
12.   This uncertainty will extend beyond cases arising under 
the NLRA.  The Supreme Court recently held that, under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the test for deciding whether an 
employer "has" a particular employee is whether the employer has 





 The failure of the majority to decide whether the 
grievance chairmen are employees of the union or the employer may 
lead to numerous problems:  Is a grievance chairperson considered 
part of the bargaining unit while on leave?  Who will be liable 
if a grievance chairperson injures a third party while performing 
union work?  Who will be responsible for providing a reasonable 
accommodation to a grievance chairperson with a disability who 
needs assistance performing her union job on the employer's 
premises?  What if a grievance chairperson decides to take FMLA 
leave -- will his eligibility depend on whether the union is an 
(..continued) 
Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 660, 
___ (1997).  The Court noted, however, that "the employment 
relationship is most readily demonstrated by the individual's 
appearance on the employer's payroll."  Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 
___; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Notice No. 
N-915-052, Policy Guidance:  Whether Part-Time Employees Are 
Employees (Apr. 1990), at 24, reprinted in 3 EEOC Compl. Man. 
(BNA), at N:3311 (interpreting both Title VII and ADEA; while 
one's status as an employee is defined by examining the 
employment relationship, "[t]he payroll is a reliable indicator 
of those individuals who have an employment relationship with the 
employer and therefore are employees.").  While grievance 
chairmen have an employment relationship with the union 
(indicating that the employer is the union), their relationship 
with the company is not completely severed, and they continue to 
appear on the company's payroll (indicating that the employer is 
the company). 
 
 I would note also that this is not a traditional dual-
employer case where both the union and the company may be 
considered employers of the grievance chairmen.  In the 
traditional dual-employer case, the individual performs services 
for both the company and the union and is paid by both the 
company and the union for the services performed for the 
respective payor.  In this case, in contrast, the individuals 
perform services exclusively for one entity and are paid 





FMLA employer or whether the company is an FMLA employer?13  If a 
grievance chairperson is injured while performing union duties, 
will she nevertheless be entitled to disability or workers' 
compensation from the company?  May the company terminate, 
suspend or discipline a grievance chairperson if he engages in 
activity that would qualify for termination, suspension or 
discipline for other employees?  These questions are admittedly 
outside the scope of the narrow issue before us, but the 
majority's decision will assuredly lead to innumerable disputes 
about the proper classification of individuals who remain on the 
company's payroll without performing any services for the 
company.  If we affirm the judgment of the district court, 
however, it is clear that individuals who leave the company to 
work for the union are union employees, and the above questions 
resolve themselves. 
 The final and most important policy consideration not 
addressed by the majority is that federal labor policy demands 
that labor organizations and employers remain separate and 
                     
13.   The Senate Report accompanying the Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993 states that the term "employ" means "maintain 
on the payroll."  S. Rep. No. 103-3, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. 22, 
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 24 (individuals on leaves of 
absence are considered employees "so long as they are on the 
employer's payroll.").  It would seem, therefore, that grievance 
chairmen are employees of the company for purposes of the FMLA.  
The Report also states, however, that Congress desired that 
"employ" under the FMLA mean the same as "employ" under Title 
VII.  As noted supra note 8, it is not clear whether the union or 






distinct from one another.  The majority would sanction a pay 
practice that violates this important policy. 
 By enacting the labor laws as written, Congress 
insisted that the NLRB and the courts observe a sharp line 
between management and labor.  NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural 
Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 192-93, 102 S.Ct. 216, 230, 
70 L.Ed.2d 323 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Indeed, the dividing line between 
management and labor is "fundamental to the industrial philosophy 
of the labor laws in this country."  Id. at 193, 102 S.Ct. at 
230; see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 
416 U.S. 267, 284-85 n.13, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1767 n.13, 40 L.Ed.2d 
134 (1974) (recognizing "traditional distinction between labor 
and management"); Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 
494-95, 67 S.Ct. 789, 794-95, 91 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1947) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting) ("industrial philosophy" recognizes that 
management and labor are "basic opposing forces"); Cedars-Sinai 
Medical Center v. Cedars-Sinai Housestaff Assoc., 223 NLRB 251, 
254 (1976) (Fanning, member, dissenting) ("underlying Federal 
labor policy . . . seeks to draw a line between labor and 
management").  Congress' desire to preserve the distinction 
between labor and management is evinced throughout the labor 
laws.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).  I believe that allowing an 
employer to provide financial support to a union, as the majority 









 I recognize that labor organizations and employers have 
begun to embrace a more cooperative method of negotiating and 
dispute resolution, and I applaud labor-management efforts to 
retreat from the adversarial approach that has often marred the 
labor landscape in this country.  I believe, however, that the 
payments sanctioned by the majority go too far.  The financial 
support sought by the United Auto Workers in this case 
contravenes the longstanding tradition of separation of labor and 
management.  I accept and encourage arm's length cooperation 
between labor and management.  I cannot condone payments that 
threaten the independence of labor, create conflicts of interest 
for union negotiators, and violate the plain language of our 
laws.  It is for Congress, not the courts, to determine if and 
when to permit labor organizations and employers to blur the line 
between them. 
 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. International Union, et al. 
No. 96-7012 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 If I were a legislator, I would not vote to criminalize 





agree with the majority that these payments differ from the 
corrupt practices that usually figure in prosecutions under 
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
186.  Moreover, I am not certain that the Congress that enacted 
Section 302 would have chosen to outlaw such payments if it had 
focused specifically on that question.   
 Our job, however, is to interpret Section 302 as it is 
written.  "The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, 
except in the `rare cases [in which] the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters.'"  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  Here, the majority 
has not heeded the plain meaning of Section 302 and has not shown 
that the literal application of the statutory language would lead 
to a result that is "demonstrably at odds" with congressional 
intent.  I therefore dissent.   
 As the majority acknowledges, Section 302 prohibits 
Caterpillar from paying the grievance chairmen unless those 
payments fall within one of the exceptions set out in Section 
302(c), 29 U.S.C. §186(c).  See Maj. Op. at 4-5.  The exception 
at issue here is that contained in subsection (c)(1), which 
applies to "any money or other thing of value payable by an 
employer . . . to any representative of his employees, . . . who 





compensation for, or by reason of, his service as an employee of 
such employer."  29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(1).  The union argues that 
these payments fall within this exception for three separate 
reasons: (1) they are compensation for the grievance chairmen's 
current service as Caterpillar employees; (2) they are 
compensation for the grievance chairmen's former service as 
Caterpillar employees; and (3) they are made "by reason of" the 
grievance chairmen's former service as Caterpillar employees.  I 
briefly discuss each of these theories below.  
 
 I.   
"As Compensation For" Current Service as a Caterpillar Employee 
 Although the union's primary arguments appear to be 
that the payments are made "as compensation for" or "by reason 
of" the grievance chairmen's past service as regular Caterpillar 
employees, the union also maintains that these payments are legal 
because they may be viewed "as compensation for" the grievance 
chairmen's work as current Caterpillar employees.  The union 
contends that the grievance chairmen, who are officially on 
leaves of absence from Caterpillar, are joint employees of 
Caterpillar and the union.  Among other things, the union notes 
that Section 302(c)(1) seems to contemplate such joint 
employment, since it permits an employer, under certain 
circumstances, to make payments to "any representative of his 





 And the union argues that under National Labor Relations Board 
decisions the grievance chairmen qualify as joint employees. 
 I find it unnecessary to reach the question whether the 
grievance chairmen may be considered joint employees.  Assuming 
that they are, I am convinced that Caterpillar's payments to them 
are not made "as compensation for" their service as current 
Caterpillar employees.  In their capacity as grievance chairmen, 
they owe their complete loyalty to the workers they represent.  
See Dist. Ct. Op. at 14-15.  They plainly work for the union and 
not for Caterpillar, and as the majority notes, their 
representation of the workers "often places them in a position 
adverse to Caterpillar's."  Maj. Op. at 7.14   
 It is noteworthy that the union's excellent brief, 
while arguing strenuously that the chairmen are joint employees, 
makes little effort to show that the pay and benefits they 
receive are compensation for services performed for Caterpillar. 
 The union's brief merely states: 
Caterpillar . . . realizes substantial benefit from the 
chairman's work.  As the record shows, the chairman's 
job . . . is "to make sure that contract works" and if 
he succeeds, "everyone benefits -- the workers, the 
Company and its production needs, and the Union."  App. 
260. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 48. 
                     
14.   I note that the union's brief acknowledges that "the 
Union certainly exercises primary control over the chairman and 






 This argument seems to me to obliterate the 
distinction, which is surely significant in the real world, 
between services performed for an employer and services performed 
for a union.  I do not question the proposition that "everyone 
benefits" if the contract works; nor do I question the 
proposition that the grievance chairmen can help to make the 
contract work; but I do not think that it follows that the work 
that they do should be regarded under Section 302(c)(1) as 
services performed for Caterpillar.  By this reasoning, everyone 
who helps to make the contract work, including presumably the 
union officers, could be viewed as working for Caterpillar.  And 
since the union, as well as Caterpillar, benefits when the 
contract works, everyone who helps to make the contract work, 
including Caterpillar officers and supervisors, could be viewed 
as working for the union.  Thus, the union's logic leads to 
preposterous results.  Therefore, regardless of whether or not 
the chairmen may be technically considered to be joint employees 
of both Caterpillar and the union, I reject the argument that the 
payments in question here can be permitted on the theory that 
they constitute payments made to the chairmen "as compensation 
for" current services performed by them for Caterpillar.  See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 16 n.14 (because chairmen perform no functions 
on behalf of Caterpillar, payments are not for services rendered 
by chairmen to Caterpillar whether or not they can be considered 







 "As Compensation For" Past Service as a Caterpillar Employee 
 I agree with the majority that the payments made to a 
grievance chairman do not constitute "compensation for . . . his 
service" as a company employee prior to his selection for a 
grievance position.  This point can be demonstrated by 
considering the following situation.  Suppose that an employee 
works for a number of years in a certain job category and 
receives during that period the same wages and other benefits as 
all the other employees in the same job category with the same 
seniority.  Suppose that the employee is then selected to serve 
as a grievance chairman, and that he then entirely ceases his 
prior work and devotes his full time to grievance work, but 
continues to receive wages and benefits from the employer.  It is 
plain that the wages and benefits that this employee receives 
after becoming a grievance chairman are compensation for his 
grievance work, not for the work that he did prior to his 
selection as a grievance chairman.  If these payments were 
compensation for his prior work, then his compensation for that 
work would exceed that of the other employees with equal 
seniority who had labored in the same job category.  Moreover, if 
the payments were compensation for previously completed work (in 
other words, if the payments had been fully earned before the 





presumably be entitled to receive those payments if, instead of 
serving as a grievance chairman, he went fishing.  But of course 
that is not the case.    
 Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the 
payments at issue here are not compensation for a grievance 
chairman's work prior to his selection for that position.  As the 
majority states: "[t]he chairmen were already compensated for 
their production line work long ago in the form of wages and 
vested benefits."  Maj. Op. at 7-8.  "It is difficult indeed to 
comprehend how years, even decades, of paid union leave can 
realistically be thought of as compensation for time spent on the 
factory floor."  Maj. Op. at 8-9. 
 
 III. 
 "By Reason Of" Past Service as a Caterpillar Employee 
 While the majority holds that the payments to the 
grievance chairmen are not "compensation" for their past service, 
the majority concludes that the payments are "payable . . . by 
reason of" the grievance chairmen's former service as Caterpillar 
employees.  In reaching this conclusion, however, the majority 
does not explain with any specificity what it understands the 
phrase "by reason of" to mean.  Nor does the majority take note 
of the clear meaning of that phrase in common parlance.   If the 
majority paid more attention to the meaning of this language, it 





are not made "by reason of" the grievance chairmen's past service 
as Caterpillar employees. 
 A.  Dictionaries define the phrase "by reason of" to 
mean "because of" or "on account of."  See The Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 1197 (1967); 2 The Compact 
Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 2431 (1971).  When x is 
said to have occurred "by reason of" y, what is usually meant is 
that y was, if not the sole cause of x, at least the or a major 
cause.  If y was simply a "but-for" cause but not a major cause 
of y, x is not said to have occurred "by reason of" y.   
 This pattern of usage can be demonstrated by 
constructing sentences that use the phrase "by reason of" to 
refer to weak "but-for" causes.  Such sentences invariably seem 
inapt and make it apparent that this use of the phrase "by reason 
of" is inappropriate.  Here are some examples.   
 President Clinton could not have become President had 
he not reached the age of 35, but it would be ridiculous to say 
that he became President "by reason of" having attained his 
thirty-fifth birthday.   
 The Green Bay Packers could not have won Super Bowl 
XXXI without defeating the San Francisco Forty-Niners in the 
first round of the playoffs.  However, it would seem quite odd to 
say that the Packers won the Super Bowl "by reason of" defeating 





 The judges of this court almost certainly would not 
have been appointed if they had not graduated from law school.  
Yet it would seem very strange to say that the judges of this 
court were appointed "by reason of" having obtained law degrees.  
 I believe that these examples show that the phrase "by 
reason of x" refers at a minimum to a major reason for x, not 
simply a relatively minor "but-for" cause, and it therefore seems 
clear that Caterpillar's payments to the grievance chairmen are 
not made "by reason of" their prior service as Caterpillar 
employees.  Such past service may be necessary for election as a 
grievance chairman (perhaps because Section 302 is thought to 
require this) and thus to the receipt of the payments at issue, 
but past service as a regular Caterpillar employee is certainly 
not the or a major cause for the payments.15  One way to see this 
is to consider the fact that Caterpillar has thousands of former 
employees, but only a very few of them are ever selected as 
grievance chairmen.  Since all have prior service for the company 
in common, yet only a handful become chairmen, factors other than 
prior service for the company must be much more important in 
influencing their selection.    
                     
15.  In Trailways Lines, Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 785 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 932 (1986), we noted that "[w]hile the Union is 
correct in asserting that had these individuals never been 
Trailways' employees they would not be eligible for pension 
contributions made on their behalf, it does not therefore follow 
that the pension fund contributions made by Trailways . . . were 
made 'in compensation for, or by reason of,' their former service 





 B.  It should be noted that nowhere in its briefs does 
the union urge that the phrase "by reason of" should be 
interpreted as requiring merely "but-for" causation.  In fact, 
the government's brief supporting the union agrees with my 
interpretation of "by reason of".  Gov't Br. at 12 (discussing 
"common understanding of 'by reason of,' as synonymous with 
'because,' 'on account of,' owing to,' 'due to' etc.").  See also 
Appellant's Reply to Suppl. Br. at 3 ("there is no question" that 
"an employer may pay a former employee who is also a union 
official what he is owed because of his service as an employee 
and not one cent more") (emphasis in original) (quotation 
omitted).   
 Rather, the union's argument is that "the most natural 
reading [of `by reason of'] is that this phrase refers to 
payments which an individual earns the right to receive by 
serving as an employee but which are not, strictly speaking, 
remuneration for particular hours of work."  Appellant's Br. at 
21 (emphasis added).  Accord id. at 34 ("so long as the right to 
such payments is earned by previously having performed `service 
to the employer'"); Appellant's Reply Br. at 18-19 ("`preexisting 
wage and benefit payments' for an employee elected to a full-time 
union position qualify as `payments by reason of' service as an 
employee, at least where the right to such payments has been 
collectively bargained and accrued as a result of the employee's 





omitted); id. at 21 (the "by reason of" exception "leaves no room 
for payments which were not earned by prior service").  The union 
contends that the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. 
Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1312 (1995), supports its position that Caterpillar's payments to 
the chairmen were "by reason of" their service as Caterpillar 
employees.  Phillips held that payments by a company to a union 
official were illegal if the union official "did not have a right 
to such payment before he severed his employment relationship 
with the company."  Id. at 1575.  The union relies (Br. at 37) on 
the court's explanation that "[w]hen an employee's right to a 
benefit has fully vested before the leave of absence begins, 
there is no danger of corruption when the employer delivers the 
benefit after that employee leaves the company to work for the 
union . . . ."  Id. at 1576.     
 I agree that a payment from Caterpillar to a former 
employee now working as a grievance chairman would be legal under 
Section 302 if the chairman's right to that payment vested before 
he became a former employee.  This interpretation of the "by 
reason of" exception has been adopted by several other courts of 
appeals.  See Phillips, 19 F.3d at 1575; Toth v. USX Corp., 883 
F.2d 1297, 1303 n.8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994 
(1989).  Cf. BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Local 227, Int'l Chem. 





 But the union's argument fails on its own terms here, 
because it is simply not true that the chairmen's rights to 
receive the payments at issue vested before they left 
Caterpillar's employ.  On the contrary, their rights to receive 
these payments are conditioned upon their performance of certain 
duties in their current positions as grievance chairmen.  If, as 
the union argues, the chairmen's rights to these payments were 
earned before their employment with Caterpillar terminated, then 
the chairmen could go fishing all day, every day, instead of 
processing grievances.  Here, contrary to the government's 
argument, see Gov't Br. at 16, the payments made by Caterpillar 
are measured by the chairmen's current services for another 
employer, i.e., the union; they can earn as much as 46 hours' pay 
if they perform sufficient work, but if they perform less work 
they receive less and if they perform no work -- if they just go 
fishing -- they get nothing at all.  In this respect, then, this 
case is identical to Trailways, and the union fails completely in 
its attempt to distinguish it on the ground that the chairmen are 
paid at a rate set by Caterpillar rather than by the union.   
 The basic problem with the union's argument is that it 
confuses an employee's eligibility for a payment with his right 
to it.  The chairmen's prior service as employees of Caterpillar 
rendered them eligible to receive their Caterpillar salaries if 
they were elected as chairmen, but their prior service in no way 





it is obvious that their prior service is not the sole or even a 
major reason for their receipt of the disputed payments.  It thus 
cannot be said -- absent outright linguistic torture -- that the 
payments are made "by reason of" their prior service.  
 C.  The majority's main argument in support of its "by 
reason of" holding is that under the collective bargaining 
agreement "every employee implicitly gave up a small amount in 
current wages and benefits in exchange for a promise that, if he 
or she should someday be elected grievance chairperson, 
Caterpillar would continue to pay his or her salary."  Maj. Op. 
at 11.  In other words, the majority views the collective 
bargaining agreement as providing each employee with the 
contingent right to receive future payments from the company 
after that employee's regular service has terminated (the 
contingencies being the employee's selection and subsequent work 
as a grievance chairperson).  Moreover, the majority appears to 
argue that a bit of each employee's work under the collective 
bargaining agreement goes to pay for this contingent right, and 
the majority therefore reasons that if an employee is later 
selected as a grievance chairman and receives salary and benefits 
from Caterpillar, those payments are received "by reason of" the 
bit of that employee's past service that went to pay for this 
contingent right.   
 This argument is inventive -- but wrong.  At the 





leads to strange results that the majority does not seem to 
contemplate.  The majority's argument is dependent on a grievance 
chairman's having "paid," while working as a regular employee, 
for the contingent right to receive future payments from the 
employer.  Thus, the argument cannot justify the initial 
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement containing a 
provision such as the one in question here.  Suppose that a 
particular company and union had never before agreed on an 
arrangement under which the company would pay the grievance 
chairmen but that the company and the union then enter into such 
an arrangement.  The first group of employees chosen as grievance 
chairmen would not have previously made any "payments" to the 
employer in exchange for the contingent right to receive future 
wages and benefits from the employer.  Therefore, even under the 
majority's theory, the company's payments to the initial group of 
grievance chairmen would be illegal.  In other words, the 
majority's theory leads logically to the weird result that the 
company and the initial group of grievance chairmen would have to 
commit federal felonies in order to set in motion the type of 
arrangement that the majority sanctions.16   
 Moreover, although the majority postulates that regular 
employees "pay" for the contingent right to receive future 
compensation from the employer, it is by no means clear that this 
                     
16.  I would assume that the same would be true every time a new 





is true in most cases.  Obviously, each regular employee gives up 
wages and/or other benefits in exchange for the employer's 
payments to the grievance chairmen, but what each regular 
employee is chiefly "paying" for is not the contingent right to 
receive future payments from the employer but rather the current 
improvement in the handling of grievances that presumably results 
from the work of the grievance chairmen.  Indeed, under most 
circumstances, I suspect that virtually all, if not all, of the 
"payments" made by a regular employee in any particular year go 
to fund the employer's payments to the grievance chairmen in that 
year and not in future years when that employee might himself be 
a grievance chairman.17 
                     
17.  It makes sense that a regular employee should pay little if 
anything for the contingent right discussed in the text (as 
distinct from a current improvement in grievance handling) 
because, from the standpoint of a wealth-maximizing regular 
employee, this contingent right has little if any value.  This is 
so for two reasons.  First, this contingent right carries little 
prospect of financial gain.  A regular employee, if selected as a 
grievance chairman, will have to make future contributions of 
labor (performing the work of a grievance chairman) that are 
fully worth the wages and benefits that the employer will 
provide.  (Indeed, under the collective bargaining agreement 
before us here, a regular employee selected as a grievance 
chairman does not realize any gain in wages or benefits; he 
continues to receive the same wages and benefits as he did 
before.)  Second, this contingent right probably does little to 
increase an employee's chances of obtaining whatever non-monetary 
gratification may flow from doing the work of a grievance 
chairman as opposed to the work of a regular employee.  Assuming 
that employees in a particular bargaining unit who are willing to 
forgo $x per year in exchange for their employer's payments to 
the grievance chairmen would be willing to pay the same amount 
per year in increased union dues so that the union could make 
these payments, there will be approximately the same number of 
grievance chairman positions (and therefore approximately an 
equal chance of performing the work of a grievance chairman) 





 Finally and most importantly, postulating that each 
regular employee "pays" something for the contingent right to 
future compensation by the employer does not obviate the problem 
that past service as a regular employee is not the sole or even a 
major cause of this future compensation.  Assuming that each 
regular employee makes such "payments" and that the payments are 
a but-for cause of any compensation that this employee may 
receive in the future as a grievance chairman, there are two 
other, more important causes of that compensation:  selection as 
a grievance chairman and the satisfactory performance of the work 
of a grievance chairman on a daily basis.  Thus, to say that a 
grievance chairman is paid year after year after year "by reason 
of" his past service as a regular employee makes no more sense 
than to say that a regular employee is paid year after year after 
year "by reason of" his having acquired the qualifications that 
were necessary for his original hiring.    
 For these reasons, it seems clear to me that the 
payments at issue in this case are made "by reason of" the 
chairmen's grievance work and not "by reason of" their prior 
service as regular employees.  Consequently, these payments 
cannot be squeezed into the "by reason of" exception in Section 
302(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §186(c)(1), and I am therefore constrained 
to conclude that these payments are prohibited by the plain 





 D.  The majority also argues that by exempting payments 
made "by reason of" a former employee's past service in addition 
to payments made "as compensation for" that service, Congress 
must have intended that the two phrases refer to different 
things.  I have no quarrel with this elementary principle of 
statutory interpretation, but I do not agree with the majority's 
application of it.  The majority fails to acknowledge that three 
courts of appeals have construed "by reason of" to refer to a 
class of payments distinct from those covered by the "as 
compensation for" exemption, and that those courts have not 
adopted anything like the interpretation espoused by the 
majority.  Because the Eleventh Circuit's discussion in Phillips 
precisely answers the majority's contention, I quote it at 
length: 
Congress, in using the alternative formulations of "as 
compensation for" and "by reason of" in that provision, 
intended to remove from the statute's prohibitions two 
general categories of payments to employees: (1) wages, 
i.e., sums paid to an employee specifically "as 
compensation for" work performed; and (2) payments not 
made specifically for work performed that are 
occasioned "by reason of" the fact that the employee 
has performed (or will perform, in the case of a 
current employee) work for the employer.  The latter 
category includes employee "fringe" benefits, such as 
vacation pay, sick pay, and pension benefits.  Whether 
"as compensation for" or "by reason of" service to an 
employer, all payments from an employer to a union 
official must relate to services actually rendered by 
the employee for the section 186(c)(1) exception to 
apply. * * *  
 
An employee's "right" to receive a "benefit" while on leave with 
the union has been upheld when it vested before the 
employee began the leave of absence . . . . In 
contrast, the section 186(c)(1) exception does not 





former employee, but who did not have a right to such 
payment before he severed his employment relationship 
with the company. 
 
19 F.3d at 1575 (first and third emphases added) (citations 
omitted).  BASF Wyandotte Corp., on which Phillips principally 
relied, deemed "fring[e] benefits" such as "vacation pay, sick 
pay, paid leave for jury duty or military service, pension 
benefits, and the like" to be within the "by reason of" 
exception.  791 F.2d at 1049.  Accord Toth, 883 F.2d at 1303 n.8 
(severance payments are "by reason of" former employee's past 
service).  These decisions are consistent with Trailways' holding 
that the payments to former employees contemplated by section 
302(c)(1) are those that relate to "past services actually 
rendered by those former employees while they were employees of 
the company."  Trailways, 785 F.2d at 106 (emphases in original). 
 Thus, the distinction between the "alternative 
formulations" is that "compensation" refers to wages paid for 
specific work performed, while "by reason of" refers to non-wage 
payments made after an employee becomes a former employee but 
earned while he or she was still an employee.18  In contrast to 
                     
18.  In Toth, the Seventh Circuit interpreted our decision in 
Trailways as resting on the proposition that "any compensation 
continuing beyond the time of an employee's 'past' employment 
could not be 'by reason of' [that] employment."  883 F.2d at 
1302.  While I am less confident than the Toth court that 
Trailways should be read so to hold, I agree with the Toth court 
that some payments made after the termination of the recipient's 
employment with the company can be made "by reason of" his or her 
prior employment.  What is important is whether the recipient has 
a right to the payment before he or she leaves the company, not 





the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the majority here 
holds that the "by reason of" exception refers to wage payments 
that would not be made but for the recipient's prior service as 
an employee.    
 E.  The only justification for disregarding the plain 
meaning of the "by reason of" exception would be that it would 
produce "a result demonstrably at odds" with congressional intent 
or "would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute."  Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (quotation 
omitted), but the majority does not even attempt to make such a 
showing.  I see nothing that demonstrates that following the 
plain meaning of the statutory language would produce a result 
that is demonstrably at odds with Congress' intent.  I find 
nothing conclusive in the legislative history, and while I agree 
with the majority that the payments in question here are quite 
different from "bribery and extortion," Maj. Op. at 13, there are 
reasons, many of which are set out in Judge Mansmann's opinion, 
why Congress might have wished to preclude such employer 
payments.  I will simply note that this very case serves as an 
example of why Congress might have wanted to prohibit the 
payments at issue.  The majority's description of these payments 
as "innocuous" (Maj. Op. at 8) ignores the fact that 
Caterpillar's decision to stop paying the chairmen's salaries was 
(..continued) 






designed to "put economic pressure on the Union" during the 
strike.  (App. 144) Prohibiting company control over such 
payments furthers the goal of union independence by removing this 
weapon from the company's arsenal.  In short, while I am unsure 
whether this prohibition is on balance desirable or undesirable, 
I am certain that it is far from absurd.  The "explicit statutory 
direction" that the majority purports to find wanting (Maj. op. 
at 14) is plainly contained in the text of Section 302.   
 The history of "no docking" provisions, which seems to 
form the centerpiece of the union's submission, also does not 
persuade me to disregard the plain statutory language.  "No 
docking" provisions differ, at least in degree, from the type of 
arrangement that is before us, and there are times in the law 
when differences in degree are dispositive.  In any event, the 
legality of "no docking" provisions is unsettled; that question 
is not before us; and, like Judge Mansmann, I would not reach it 
here.     
 Since Section 302 is a criminal statute, I would apply 
the rule of lenity if I thought that the statutory language was 
ambiguous, see, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 
(1990), but since I see no ambiguity, I find that rule 
inapplicable.  See Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2029 (1995)), 
(rule of lenity applies only "if, `after seizing everything from 
which aid can be derived,' we can make `no more than a guess as 





therefore affirm the decision of the district court.  If this 
result is not desirable as a matter of public policy, the union 
and its amicus, the United States, surely understand how to seek 




                     
19.  Indeed, the government's amicus brief seems at places to 
amount to a request that we craft a legislative solution to the 
problem of collective bargaining agreements that call for 
employers to make payments to former employees who become union 
officials.  According to the government's brief, such payments 
may violate Section 302 if they are "incommensurate" with the 
recipient's former compensation as a regular employee, if the 
recipient negotiated the right to receive those payments, or if 
the recipient has not worked for the employer in his or her 
regular job for an extended period and is unlikely ever to return 
to such work.  U.S. Amicus Br. at 26-28.  These may be sensible 
rules, but I am unable to tease them out of the current language 
of Section 302.  They provide material for legislative, not 
judicial, consideration.  
